Consistency checking in the CSP B approach verifies that an individual controller process, defined using a sequential non-divergent subset of CSP, never calls a B operation outside its precondition. Previously this was done by preprocessing the CSP process to perform a weakest precondition semantics proof. An embedding of the CSP traces model already exists in the PVS theorem prover, which makes use of 'uniform properties' to define valid traces. By including a state model we can extend the notion of uniform properties to define consistency. In this paper we give a framework which uses these semantic embeddings to eliminate the need for preprocessing. CSP B supports compositional verification, and the added benefit of this framework is that rely/guarantee style decomposition emerges naturally during a proof of consistency.
Introduction
CSP B is an approach that has been developing over a number of years. Its primary goal it to separate state and event based aspects of a specification. We have developed a theoretical framework which centres around the parallel composition of CSP processes and B machines. This composition is formally justified by Morgan's failures-divergences semantics for actions system [10] , that can also be applied to B.
Our approach focuses on establishing divergence freedom, deadlock freedom and proving safety and liveness properties of particular systems. Examples of such systems include data-rich protocols and information systems. The novelty of the approach is that when it is applied in practice all of these properties can potentially be proved using existing tool support. Morgan's notion of divergence freedom and some simple state-based safety properties could be proved using a theorem prover, while deadlock freedom and other behavioural properties can be verified using FDR.
This paper re-examines how consistency (divergence freedom) of CSP B specifications can be verified with tool support. Without it there is a weakness in the practical applicability of our approach. It is important that this is addressed because the theory for all the other properties assumes divergence freedom. Therefore, even if we can prove the other properties using FDR their results would only hold if we can also show divergence freedom. Until now, consistency has been established using a loop invariant technique, which is described in Section 3 (further details can be found in [15] ). In order to make consistency checking practical, we need to embed this technique into a theorem prover. This gives rise to several possibilities, some of which have already been explored. The first is to alter one of the commercial toolkits which support the B-Method. We have considered this but changing the internal workings of such a tool is not straightforward. We have therefore turned our attention to general purpose theorem provers to embed the B method. We have attempted to use an existing shallow embedding of B in PVS [2] . However, this embedding proved to be too naïve for our purposes, and we are forced to consider deeper embeddings.
This paper gives our preferred approach to providing tool support for consistency checking using so-called 'uniform properties' [9] . It makes use of an existing PVS embedding of the traces model of CSP, and shows how these properties need to be extended for CSP B sequences of operation calls (which are akin to traces but with state updates).
Background
An individual CSP B component (P M ) comprises a CSP controller process P encapsulating a single flow of control for a B machine M . This allows a clear separation of concerns between the data structures used in a specification and the control flow of the events/operations within a specification. As an example, Figure 1 illustrates a controller, called RCtrl, that cycles through a sequence of operation calls of the Repeater machine. We elaborate on the details of the example below, and use it to annotate the theoretical results. In order to consider the composition of a controller and a machine, the B machine needs to be provided with a CSP semantics.
Morgan [10] provides failures/divergences semantics for event systems in terms of the weakest precondition of a sequence of operation calls. A sequence tr is the sequential composition of the operation calls of M , and init is the initialisation of the system. The CSP trace inc, do, inc, inc, do, reset is considered to be a trace of the Repeater machine since it is the case that ¬wp(init;Inc;Do;Inc;Inc;Do;Reset, false) holds. Note that there is a one to one correspondence between the CSP events and operation calls. In this paper, we are only concerned with non-blocking B operations (i.e. ones without guards) and therefore all sequences of operation calls are traces. However, operations called outside their preconditions are not guaranteed to terminate (i.e. they can diverge). In order to differentiate between divergent and nondivergent traces we need to determine whether the sequence is guaranteed to terminate following initialisation (i.e. establish the postcondition true). A sequence is a divergence if it is not guaranteed to establish true (e.g. ¬wp(init;Inc;Do;Do, true)). In this example, the second invocation of the Do operation may occur in a state where the precondition n > 0 does not hold (because it is possible to reach a state in which n = 0). A sequence does not diverge if it is guaranteed to terminate: Definition 1.2 M 's non-divergent traces are those for which wp(init;tr , true) holds.
Since wp(init;Inc;Do;Reset, true) holds, the trace inc, do, reset is nondivergent.
A New Characterisation of Divergence Freedom
We have seen in Section 1.1 how the non-divergent traces of a B machine are characterised using the wp notation. In this section we define an alternative (but equivalent) characterisation. We use the example in Figure 1 to illustrate the results of this section.
Properties of recursive data structures such as traces in which the order of the contents of the data structure is irrelevant have been investigated in [9] under the classification of 'uniform properties'. Within this classification, we identify a requirement that needs to be true for each element of a trace. We refer to this as an event predicate. In our case, the event predicate will capture the requirement that an operation's precondition holds (as we shall see in Section 2.2). We shall see in Section 4.3 how the event predicate can be extended when we consider consistency of multiple, interacting components. Before we consider consistency using uniform properties, we consider uniform properties in general.
Defining Uniform Properties
So-called 'every' properties of algebraic datatypes are introduced by Jensen in [9] to characterise those recursive data structures in which every element fulfils some requirement. For example, for lists of integers, one uniform property is that every element of the list must be non-negative. More generally, if we consider lists then, given a requirement r on the elements of a list l , the combinator every(r )(l ) is defined as follows
In this definition, nil denotes the empty list and cons(h, t) denotes a nonempty list whose first element h is suffixed by the list t. If we require every element of a list of integers to be non-negative, for example, then we can define r as r (x ) = x ≥ 0. The PVS verification system has acknowledged the value of such properties because 'every' properties (and complementary 'some' properties) are generated automatically via its abstract datatype mechanism [12] .
In the context of non-blocking B machines, our characterisation of nondivergent traces is that every operation must be called within its precondition. This will depend on the state of the machine when the operation is called as well as any values input to the operation. Therefore, our characterisation of the non-divergent traces must keep track of the state as the operations are executed. Indeed, as operations can be non-deterministic, we must track sets of states (or, equivalently, predicates on states). Let p(h)(S )(S ) be the requirement that operation h is called within its precondition when the state prior to its execution is contained in S and the resulting state is contained in S . For example, if S is {s | s.n = 1}
3 for state variable n, then executing Do results in a state S where S = {s | s.n = 2 ∨ s.n = 0}. Then we can define the property − −− → every as follows
The direction of the arrow indicates that we move from the before state predicate S to the after state predicate T 4 . Thus, for non-empty traces we are required to find an intermediate state predicate S that is reachable by the operation h and is a suitable before state predicate for the remainder of the trace t. The relevance of the subset condition S ⊆ T for the empty trace will become clear in Section 4.2.
It is, of course, possible to give a definition in which we move from the after state predicate to the before state predicate. Let p be defined as in − −− → every. Then we can define the property ← −− − every as follows
Here we use an alternative list constructor add such that, given a list t and an element e, add (t, e) places e at the end of t. Consider T = {s | s.n = 1}. In order for Inc to reach a state satisfying T , then the before state must satisfy S where S = {s | s.n = 0}. This definition will be useful in Section 2.2 to show the correspondence between this characterisation of non-divergent traces and the wp definition given in Section 1.1.
Proof. Proof by induction on the length of tr . 2
Note that we do not give a specific definition for p. However, we are required to make constraints on the possible instances of p. In particular, p is required to be contravariant with respect to the before state predicate S and covariant with respect to the after state predicate T . That is
A Correspondence Result
In order to show a correspondence between the uniform properties defined above and the original characterisation of non-divergent traces using the wp semantics, we have to give specific instances to p, S and T in ← −− − every(p)(S )(T ). The reason for using ← −− − every is due to the backward nature of wp proofs. That is, we start with a final state predicate and proceed to an initial state predicate.
Termination and Before-After Predicates of Operations.
The wp calculus is syntactic, and the rules for manipulating wp expressions are defined as axioms. In [1] , Abrial defines a relational model in terms of two predicates: a termination predicate and a before-after predicate. The termination predicate characterises the acceptable before states (i.e. the states that do not cause a divergence). Since an operation call in B corresponds to a CSP event e, we denote the termination predicate for the operation call as trm(op(e)), where op(e) denotes e's corresponding operation. For example, if s is a state in which n = 1 then trm(Do)(s) = true, whereas trm(Do)(s ) = false, if s .n = 0.
The before-after predicate characterises the reachable states of an operation in terms of the state prior to its execution. Since this can be nondeterministic, the before-after predicate is therefore a relation between before and after states. Given a CSP event e, we denote the before-after predicate for the corresponding operation call as prd (op(e)) 5 . For example, since Do is non-deterministic, prd (Do) includes the pair (s, s ) when s.n = 1 and s .n = 2, but also when s.n = 1 and s .n = 0.
An operation has input and output parameters. Since these play an important part in the termination and before-after properties of an operation, it is important to consider how they are incorporated in trm and prd . Unfortunately this is not addressed in sufficient detail in [1] , so we choose to model inputs and output parameters via two special state variables inp and out respectively. Both inp and out range over every operation's parameters and, therefore, will be assigned a wide range of values. For example, if an operation has multiple input parameters then inp will be assigned a tuple of values. These variables are different from normal state variables because, as we shall see below, their values are relevant for the duration of a single operation call only. Hence, we do not have to associate unique input/output state variables for each operation; we simply reuse inp and out.
The termination predicate trm is defined in terms of the normal state variables and inp only. Intuitively, this is because termination is unaffected by the outputs of an operation. Similarly, the domain of the before-after predicate prd is defined in terms of the normal state variables and inp, but the after states define the resulting values for the normal state variables and out only. This is because operations should not be able to update the value of inp.
the non-divergent traces of a process. In terms of the wp semantics, ← −− − every(p)(S )(T )(tr ) should be true for a trace tr if, and only if, S ⇒ wp(tr , T ) where tr is the sequential composition of the operation calls that correspond to the events in tr . That is, the before state predicate S should be strong enough to guarantee the termination of the sequence of operation calls and reach a state that satisfies T .
To derive a definition of p, we begin by giving a state predicate equivalent to wp(f , T ), for an arbitrary operation call f , defined in terms of trm and prd . Note that, because f is an operation call, it will have actual parameters corresponding to the operation's arguments; we denote f 's actual input parameters as i (f ), and its actual output parameters as o(f ). Intuitively, wp(f , T ) is the weakest predicate such that f is guaranteed to terminate (i.e. not diverge) in a state that satisfies T . In B, state predicates such as T will not refer to the operation's arguments 6 . Therefore, the state predicates are concerned with normal state variables.
Proof. Proof using the normal form and definitions of trm and prd given in [1] . 2
The keyword 'WITH' in s WITH inp → i (f ) extends (normal) state s with special variable inp assigned to the value i (f ), and s WITH out → o(f ) extends (normal) state s with special variable out assigned to the value o(f ). Note, if there is no after state with output o(f ) then we get miraculous behaviour.
By including a before state predicate S , we want to establish results for expressions of the form S ⇒ wp(f , T ) which, given an extensional interpretation of ⇒ for state predicates, requires us to prove
In order to show a correspondence between ← −− − every and wp, we therefore define p(e)(S )(T ), for event e as follows. Note that the output of e, which we denote by o(e), corresponds to the input of the operation op(e). Similarly, the output of the operation op(e) corresponds to the input of event e, which is denoted by i (e).
PSfrag replacements 
In Section 1.1, non-divergent traces were defined as wp(init;tr , true). In wp, the initialisation init defines the initial set of states. From Theorem 2.7, the state predicate S characterises the states prior to the execution of tr . Hence, we can instantiate S with init to obtain the same set of states. Similarly, we can instantiate T with the predicate true to indicate successful termination. Thus, ← −− − every(p)(init)(true) characterises non-divergent traces using uniform properties.
CSP and B
In Figure 1 it is clear that the preconditions of the operations hold when the operations are called by RCtrl . As we stated in Section 1.1, divergent behaviour can occur by performing repeated Do operation calls since the precondition may not always hold. Previous results [15] have identified conditions sufficient to guarantee P M to be divergence free for a recursive controller P and a machine M . These results require the identification of a control loop invariant (CLI) on the state of the B machine M , which must be true at every recursive call. The ability to re-establish the CLI means that all operation calls do not cause a divergence. For example, an appropriate CLI for the component described in Figure 1 is n = 0.
We can compose individual components together to produce a network of interacting components. Any interaction between components is restricted to communication between controllers [13] . Hence, machines cannot communicate with each other directly, but only via their respective controllers, as is shown in Figure 2 . In addition to control events, controller processes can now perform events which do not have corresponding B operations. We refer to these events as communication events. For example, in Figure 3 there are two communication channels oddpass and evenpass. Channel oddpass communicates odd values from controller OddCtrl to controller EvenCtrl , whereas channel evenpass communicates even values in the opposite direction. In this example we consider OddCtrl OddMch as one component and EvenCtrl EvenMch as another.
Previous results [13] allow us to establish that a number of P i M i components are divergence free once we have shown that each component is divergence free. We use consistency checking for individual components and then, from the CSP semantics of parallel composition, infer divergence freedom.
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CSP Rules for Consistency Checking
A Rule for Event Prefixing
The process P = e!x ?y : V → P (y) behaves by performing the event e that outputs the value x and binds an input value v of type V to the variable y. It then behaves as P with v substituted for y. If this process is a controller for a B machine then it is consistent if P satisfies the − −− → every property. The first event in each non-empty trace of P is e.x .v . Hence, P is consistent with its B machine if, for every possible value v ∈ V , e.x .v satisfies the event predicate p, in which o(e) = x and i (e) = v , and P (v ) subsequently satisfies the − −− → every property. This motivates the following proof rule
Note that some values of V may not be output by the corresponding operation op(e). In these cases, the − −− → every property is satisfied miraculously because the conjunct involving prd in p in Definition 2.6 is vacuously true. (This is akin to coercion in [15] .)
A Fixed Point Rule for Components
In the past, consistency has been proven by translating the controller's functional into equivalent B notation so that a wp proof can be performed. Consistency checking involves the construction of an invariant on the B state (the CLI) such that, under the assumption that the CLI holds, the execution of the translated functional always terminates in a state that re-establishes the CLI. That is CLI ⇒ wp(F , CLI ) where F denotes the translated functional. If, in addition, all possible initial states satisfy the CLI then the controller and its corresponding B machine are non-divergent. This is, of course, an instance of fixed point induction, and it is more succinctly defined in terms of the − −− → every property. If
where X is of type [index → process], then CLI is an invariant state predicate. The definition of − −− → every on the empty trace means that Stop trivially satisfies this property, and we can deduce ∀ i . µ(F )(i ) sat − −− → every(p)(CLI (i ))(true). If we can then show that the initial state predicate init implies CLI for the initial parameter n then, using the contravariance of p, we can deduce
This gives us sufficient conditions for constructing a fixed point rule.
The two conjuncts in the antecedent correspond to the CLI conditions defined in [15] . The advantage of using the − −− → every property is that we no longer need to preprocess the CSP and introduce control variables (and the substitutions to update them); this is now handled by the structure of the process itself.
A Parallel Rule for Multiple Components
In the previous section, we considered individual components. We now consider the composition of multiple components (as in Figure 2) . Parallel composition in CSP preserves divergence freedom: if P is divergence free and Q is divergence free then P Q is divergence free. This is also true for CSP B components: two consistent components put in parallel are consistent. This is justified by the following rule
This lemma is true providing the following conditions are met
• the operations controlled by P are disjoint from the operations controlled by Q
• the state affected by the operations of P is unaffected by the operations of Q (and vice versa)
• the only events common to both P and Q are the communication events that do not have associated operations and, hence, do not affect the state.
Note that in Section 2.2 the event predicate is defined so that every event is associated with a B operation. By introducing CSP communication events that have no corresponding B operations, we need to augment the event predicate p so that we can continue to perform consistency checking under these new circumstances.
A Generalised Parallel Rule Incorporating Rely/Guarantee
Lemma 4.3 is sufficient to prove divergence freedom, but it is not very useful in practice. This is because the divergence freedom of one component may depend (via their synchronisation) on the behaviour of the other components, as in the example of Figure 3 . In general, if one component relies on certain values being sent on a communication channel, and another synchronising component can guarantee this, then their parallel composition results in a divergence free combination.
We can prove that a controller P guarantees the delivery of certain values on communication channel a by checking the − −− → every property using a strengthened event predicate p which, in addition to p, characterises the acceptable values on a. Conversely, a controller Q that relies on certain values being communicated on a should only be checked for consistency when such values are communicated. This can be achieved by using a weakened event predicate p that ignores all undesirable values on a. Now, if P and Q synchronise on a then, providing the strengthened pred-icate for P guarantees what Q relies on, the events of their synchronisation satisfy p. Other synchronisation channels will have their own rely/guarantee properties which can be used to augment the event predicates further.
Theorem 4.4 (a generalisation of Lemma 4.3). If
P sat − −− → every(p )(S )(T ) ∧ Q sat − −− → every(p )(S )(T ) then P Q sat − −− → every(p)(S ∧ S )(T ∧ T )
Proof of odd/even Example
The definitions in Figure 3 give an immediate partition of the state variables and operations so that we can prove that OddCtrl EvenCtrl is consistent with respect to the machines OddMch and EvenMch: OddCtrl maintains the value of odd via the operations oddput and oddget, and EvenCtrl maintains the value of even via the operations evenput and evenget. OddCtrl relies on even values being received on the synchronising channel evenpass, but guarantees that odd values will be sent on the channel oddpass. Hence, in order to use the rule presented in Theorem 4.4, we construct an event predicate p by extending trm and prd so that
Similarly, we construct an event predicate p for EvenCtrl that relies on odd values being received on oddpass and guarantees that even values will be sent on evenpass. Therefore, we have two rely/guarantee pairs in this example. By using the rule for parallel composition, we need to show that
where init odd characterises the initial values of the variable odd , and init even characterises the initial values of the variable even. Since P is a recursive process, it is the least fixed point of the following functional F F (X ) = oddget?x : N → oddpass!x → evenpass?y : N → oddput!(y + 1) → X Hence, we can use the fixed point rule (Definition 4.2) to show P satisfies the − −− → every property. That is, we must construct a CLI such that
Let us define the CLI to be odd mod 2 = 1. The initialisation of OddMch assigns the value 1 to odd , which satisfies the CLI . Hence, init odd ⊆ CLI . The second conjunct requires repeated use of the event prefixing rule (Definition 4.1) to show F (X ) sat − −− → every(p )(CLI )(true). We start by proving
In a before state satisfying the CLI, it is impossible to retrieve an even value from oddget. Hence, if x is even then the property is satisfied miraculously. Therefore, it only remains for us to prove the − −− → every property when x is odd. By observing the definition of oddget given in Figure 3 , we instantiate S with {s | s.odd mod 2 = 1 } to satisfy the event predicate p . Now we must show oddpass!x → · · · sat − −− → every(p )(S )(true) By using the prefix rule again, we observe that all states in S meet the termination requirements of oddpass (i.e. trm(oddpass)) and hence its guarantee.
Since we rely on even values being received on evenpass
is miraculous for odd values of y. Hence, we only need to check
for even values of y, . Thus, y + 1 will be odd, which meets the precondition of oddput. We can now conclude
and we are finished. A similar argument proves Q sat − −− → every(p )(init even )(true).
Putting it Together in PVS
The embedding of the state model in PVS follows Chartier's embedding in Isabelle [4] . In PVS, we represent a state as a mapping from a polymorphic type NAME (representing variable names) to a polymorphic type VALUE (representing the entire range of values). Hence, we are not constrained by particular variable names or particular value types. From this, it is relatively straightforward to define the theorems contained in this paper in PVS. When applying the theorems in practice, we want to be a bit more constraining on the range of values that a variable can take. Also, it is easier to think of states as records rather than mappings: each field of the record is identified by the name of a variable, whose values could be declared as a specific subtype of VALUE. For example, in PVS notation, we declare Name : TYPE = {x, y, z, inp, out} Note, inp and out still range over all possible values. Updating a state s can be done more succinctly by accessing the fields of s directly (e.g. s'x denotes x's value in s).
In order to make use of the theorems, we use PVS's type conversion mechanism to convert records into mappings. In this example, we must define a function C to convert an object of type State to an object of type [NAME -> VALUE]. Then PVS will use this function to perform the conversion automatically.
C(s) : [NAME -> VALUE] =
LAMBDA n: CASES n OF x : s'x, y : s'y, z : s'z, inp : s'inp, out : s'out ENDCASES
Discussion
In this paper we have shown how the uniform property defined in Section 2.1 can be used to characterise divergence freedom of the components of a CSP B specification. In this setting we have considered sequences of operation calls, and treated inputs and outputs explicitly. This is simpler than the streaming of inputs and outputs in [5] because, when considering abstract data types, sequences of operations are considered (and not their calls).
Recent emerging work has also made use of CSP in the ProB model checker for B [3] . Thus far it has not focused on decomposition but has examined how a CSP process can be combined with a B machine. It will be worth investigating whether the CLI technique can be embedded into ProB. Nonetheless, this work focuses on state and then the concurrency aspects and allow B to participate in the controlling of operations. We believe that it is still important to consider the verification of our integrated approach using PVS because in our CSP B approach the concurrent architecture is the main driver and the B is acting more as a data repository. Therefore, work is being undertaken to develop this framework in PVS so that we can capitalise on the CSP theory that already exists. The deep embedding of B in PVS will be comparable to the work of [4] which embeds the relational model of B in the Isabelle/HOL theorem prover, but it will supersede the shallow embedding of B in PVS [11] . A PVS embedding of the CSP traces model already exists [7] , and this, together with the new framework, will provide a suite of theories for verifying CSP B specifications.
